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 Abstract. Negotiations are forms of conversation, communication and bilateral or 
multilateral dialogue to resolve any kind of problem. Negotiations between Kosovo 
and Serbia are regional and global, as evidenced by the involvement of the EU and 
the US in these negotiations. The only way to finally resolve the problem between 
Kosovo and Serbia is dialogue. The purpose of the research is to analyse and 
measure Kosovo’s opinion on resolving the problem with Serbia through dialogue 
and their opinion on Kosovo’s representation in the talks and the agreement reached 
in Washington. The research was conducted through a questionnaire with structured 
questions, while a total of 470 respondents from all over Kosovo participated. 
Statistical analyses were analysed through the SPSS program, while qualitative ones 
through the inductive method. Based on the results, we see that demographic factors 
such as gender, age, and qualification affect the citizens of Kosovo’s citizens to solve 
the problem with Serbia. Part of this research was also interviewing with experts on 
the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. What we can recommend from this research is that 
dialogue should move from technical issues to political issues because the essence 
of this dialogue is political. The only way to its final solution is to reach an agreement 
that would include its resolution of all problems. The solution can be achieved 
through one of the possible scenarios in this paper in the theoretical and research 
part. 




On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its inde-
pendence. Kosovo was declared a democratic re-
public based on separation of powers, control, and 
balance. Regulated by the constitution, Kosovo 
has four essential institutions: the President, the 
Government, Parliament, and the Constitutional 
Court. Kosovo’s independence was declared in full 
compliance with the plan of Martti Ahtisaari, who 
had defined Kosovo as an independent and multi-
ethnic state and consequently, the Constitution of 
Kosovo was built on the principles of this plan. Ac-
cording to the constitution, Kosovo is a state of Al-
banians and other communities, namely Bosnian 
Serbs, Turks, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians and Go-
rani. The official languages in Kosovo are Albanian 
and Serbian. 
From the first days, Kosovo’s independence was 
recognised by many countries as the United States 
of America, Great Britain, Germany and Turkey. 
These were among the first recognitions, while 
nowadays, Kosovo officially counts a series of in-
ternational recognitions. Since the declaration of 
independence, a robust diplomatic battle has been 
taking place between Kosovo and Serbia, where 
the first party tries to secure as much recognition 
as possible. In contrast, the other party tries to 
prevent at any cost the internationalisation of the 
state Kosovo. This opposition of Serbia had the 
support of some countries supporting its policies, 
such as Russia and China, which claim that the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo was con-
trary to the United Nations Charter (UN Resolu-
tion 1244), and the Helsinki Final Act, conse-
quently contrary to the principles of international 
law. 
Serbia constantly opposes the citizenship of Ko-
sovo, while on the other hand, Kosovo promotes 
its citizenship. Relations between the two coun-
tries were and remain strained to this day. Seeing 
the situation, the European Union organised ne-
gotiations between these two parties to find a 
standard solution. 
In this paper, we will address the negotiations be-
tween Kosovo and Serbia. We will talk about the 
agreements reached since 2013, the challenges of 
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the dialogue and the difficulties that the imple-
mentation of the agreements has gone through.  
Also, the involvement of the international commu-
nity, led by the United States, in the negotiation 
process between Kosovo and Serbia will also be 
addressed. We will discuss possible scenarios and 
interpret the questionnaires conducted with citi-




Negotiations are as old as the history of humanity 
itself. Negotiations are in the human nature of 
problem-solving; they are the fairest way to over-
come various contradictions, inconsistencies or 
divergences. They approach solutions offered by 
different or opposing parties towards a compro-
mise accepted by them and produces the most 
lasting agreement [1]. Negotiations are the best 
way to compromise. They are the mechanism for 
avoiding the deepening of problems, contradic-
tions or conflicts; they are solutions that produce 
the most winners and the little losers. Negotia-
tions are a product of the need to avoid tensions, 
contradictions, conflicts and wars [1]. In case of 
disagreement, there should be an agreement that 
all avenues lead to negotiations. Negotiations, in 
this case, are the best possible solution and brings 
the most reconciliation and results between the 
parties peacefully. 
Negotiations stem from the need for peace and 
produce peace. They need to solve any problem 
between the parties through talks, exchanging 
ideas, to give proposals, and to promote bilateral 
or multilateral dialogue [1]. This need and neces-
sity are also proven in the case of negotiations be-
tween Kosovo and Serbia. 
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has its 
origins in the UN General Assembly resolution 
(64/298), adopted in 2010. This resolution ap-
proved the ICJ opinion on the declaration of Ko-
sovo’s independence by its international law. In 
this resolution, the UN General Assembly called on 
the EU to initiate a dialogue between Kosovo and 
Serbia. Both the UN and the EU thought that dia-
logue should resolve the problems between Ko-
sovo and Serbia [11]. 
Talks between Kosovo and Serbia on the normali-
sation of relations began in 2011; the European 
Union mediated these talks. The initial purpose of 
the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was to resolve all 
outstanding issues between the two countries and 
potentially result in a legally binding agreement, 
which would end the protracted conflict by nor-
malising relations between the two countries [5]. 
From the progress of the Belgrade-Pristina dia-
logue facilitated by the European Union [17], they 
have shown a more favourable climate for pro-
moting tolerance and diversity between commu-
nities and between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs [16]. 
The first political agreement between the two 
countries was reached in April 2013. This 15-
point agreement, for the most part, addresses the 
integration of the Serb community, especially the 
northern municipalities, through the associa-
tion/community of Serb-majority municipalities, 
which according to the agreement, has full powers 
in many areas [13]. 
This agreement was considered the starting point 
of a long process of normalising relations between 
Kosovo and Serbia [3]. The 1 April 2013 Agree-
ment on Principles Governing the Normalisation 
of Relations provides a solution to the conflict 
over the governance of Northern Kosovo. How-
ever, some agreement elements, such as establish-
ing an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities 
in Kosovo, have not yet been implemented com-
pletely [4]. This agreement is seen by all parties 
involved as the primary outcome and culmination 
of this negotiation process in Brussels [9]. 
The main points of this agreement are [18]:  
– establishment of an Association / Community of 
Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo;  
– the Association / Community will have complete 
oversight in the areas of economic development, 
education, health, urban and rural planning; 
– in Kosovo, there will be the police force, called 
the Kosovo Police;  
– all police in Northern Kosovo will be integrated 
into the Kosovo Police framework;  
salaries will be only from KP;  
– there will be a Regional Police Commander for 
the four northern Serb-majority municipalities 
(North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Le-
posavic);  
– the commander of this region will be a Kosovo 
Serb nominated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
from the list provided by the four mayors on be-
half of the Community / Association;  
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 4  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   2021 
– the composition of the KP in the north will re-
flect the ethnic composition of the population of 
the four municipalities (there will be another Re-
gional Commander for the municipalities of South 
Mitrovica, Skënderaj and Vushtrri); 
– the regional commander of the four northern 
municipalities will cooperate with other regional 
commanders;  
– judicial authorities will be integrated and oper-
ate within the legal framework of Kosovo;  
– an agreement that neither side will block, or en-
courage others to block, the other side’s progress 
on the respective paths to the EU.  
After reaching an agreement, the parties came up 
with various claims about its content. The Kosovo 
side claimed that the association of Serb-majority 
municipalities would have the competencies of an 
NGO, while the Serbian side stated that the associ-
ation would have executive powers. The clash be-
tween the two sides over the competencies of the 
association provoked internal reactions in Kosovo 
politics. The Kosovar opposition strongly opposed 
this agreement, calling it harmful, which would 
create instability in Kosovo’s functioning. 
The implementation plan of the Brussels Agree-
ment had foreseen deadlines that were not re-
spected and the need for further political dialogue 
for the implementation of the same. Political de-
velopments in Kosovo and Serbia, the 2014 Euro-
pean Parliament elections, brought a new EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Ms Federica Mogherini, and a new attempt 
to resume dialogue. During 2015, under the chair-
manship of the two former prime ministers of the 
two countries, Isa Mustafa and Aleksandar Vucic, 
Kosovo and Serbia had reached a block of agree-
ments, deriving from the 19 April agreement [14]. 
The agreements that emerged from these meet-
ings were different, such as the Agreement on Jus-
tice and the Judiciary, the agreement on the disso-
lution of the so-called ‘Civil Protection’, the agree-
ment on the mutual recognition of vehicle insur-
ance policies, Agreement on General Principles / 
Key Elements of the Association / Association of 
Serb Majority Municipalities, Conclusions on the 
implementation of the Energy Agreement of the 
year 2013, as well as the Telecommunications Ac-
tion Plan [18]. 
The dialogue, in general, suffered major blows, es-
pecially with the engagement of Serbian diplo-
macy against the recognition of the state of Ko-
sovo or its membership in international 
organisations such as UNESCO and INTERPOL, as 
well as the wall built on the Mitrovica bridge at a 
time when the opening of this bridge was ex-
pected. Also, the reactivation of international ar-
rests by Serbia against citizens and senior officials 
of Kosovo strained relations between the two par-
ties, leading to the suspension of dialogue by Ko-
sovo [14]. The situation calmed down with the EU 
intervention, but it did not continue this trend for 
very long. The tense situation between the parties 
failed to calm down parties in March 2017, the As-
sembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted a reso-
lution requesting the suspension of the dialogue 
process until the release of the current Prime Min-
ister of Kosovo, Mr Ramush Haradinaj, who was 
detained in France based on an arrest warrant is-
sued by Serbia [15]. 
The period 2017-2018 has been full of tensions 
and incidents in bilateral relations between Ko-
sovo and Serbia. However, all these challenges did 
not diminish the EU’s commitment to encouraging 
both sides to return to continue the process of 
normalising relations between them [20]. The 
meetings in Brussels resumed on 3 July 2017, 
when the Presidents of Kosovo and Serbia, 
Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar Vuçiç, met to agree 
that the dialogue should enter a new phase where 
more serious issues would be discussed and to 
move towards the conclusion of this process [6]. 
The parties returned to the table after the invita-
tion of the EU to continue this process on 26 and 
27 February 2018, where they discussed the im-
plementation of agreements reached such as the 
agreement on freedom of movement, integrated 
border management, an association of municipal-
ities with a Serb majority, justice, energy, and the 
Mitrovica bridge. The parties agreed to continue 
these meetings the following month. They also 
agreed that there would be no statement of their 
own after this meeting, but only an official state-
ment of the EU on the progress of this process [7]. 
The culmination of the aggravation of reports un-
til the disconnection of almost any communica-
tion occurred after Kosovo imposed a 100% tariff 
on products imported from Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on 21 November 2018. This tariff 
was set in response to the institutions of the Re-
public of Kosovo to Serbia’s aggressive campaign 
to block Kosovo’s membership in INTERPOL, as 
well as the latter’s campaign to withdraw recogni-
tion of Kosovo [14] from the imposition of the tax 
occurred the severance of dialogue between the 
two countries. The question arose that the EU rep-
resentative Mogehrini had allowed discussing the 
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 4  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   2022 
issue of redefining the territories and some other 
issues contrary to Kosovo’s will. 
The Brussels Dialogue has neither contributed to 
the strengthening of Kosovo’s statehood from 
within nor to its consolidation from outside. The 
Republic of Kosovo continues to have difficulties 
in controlling and exercising sovereignty through-
out its territory. In contrast, in the international 
arena, Kosovo continues to be blocked by Serbia 
in its efforts to join international organisa-
tions [17]. 
The direct involvement was formalised after the 
appointment of Matthew Palmer by the US State 
Department as Special Representative for the Bal-
kans in August 2019 and the appointment of Rich-
ard Grenell as Special Envoy of the US President 
for reaching a peace agreement between the two 
countries. At the beginning of 2020, Kosovo and 
Serbia, under the direct mediation of the United 
States and Richard Grenell, had signed a series of 
new agreements in the form of letters of intent re-
garding the airline, railway and highway connect-
ing two places. These agreements were pro-
claimed as an opportunity to continue the dia-
logue process towards reaching a final agreement 
based on the economic development model [14]. 
The government led by Prime Minister A. Kurti, 
formed in February 2020, formally expressed ‘in 
favour of continuing the process, had refused the 
total abolition of the 100% tariff, without estab-
lishing reciprocity, contrary to what was required 
inconsistently and persistently from the top 
American officials, who were involved in this pro-
cess. 
Although the tariff was partially removed by a de-
cision taken by the government on 20 March, this 
was assessed as insufficient by US officials, who 
even practically took the burden of concluding the 
dialogue process. The latter’s request for com-
plete and unconditional abolition of the tariff was 
ignored since, on 31 March, the incumbent gov-
ernment had decided to replace the tariff with rec-
iprocity to Serbia. However, the government’s de-
cision to abolish the 100% tariff was supported by 
most EU countries and EU officials them-
selves [14]. 
With the coming to power of the Hoti government 
[A. Hoti], in the summer of 2020, the dialogue con-
tinued but was characterised by problems be-
cause there were troubles in opening the topic of 
the association. Currently, the dialogue process 
between Kosovo and Serbia is blocked. 
Paradoxically, with the EU calls for constructive 
cooperation in the spirit of normalising relations, 
the two sides have only deepened the differences 
between them [2]. Although the dialogue remains 
suspended, there is no initiative to build a political 
consensus in Kosovo with this other type. 100% 
tariff, reciprocity, red lines and different attitude 
in the system community in this process are some 
elements that have influenced the political party 
not to reach a broader consensus on all other 
types related to the dialogue process [14]. 
In 2020, Kosovo with Prime Minister A. Hoti and 
Serbia with President A. Vucic had signed an 
agreement in the White House in the reception of 
US President Donald Trump. The agreement on 
the normalisation and international economic en-
terprise of Kosovo and Serbia is made as a move 
towards the normalisation of another average 
system. The main points that do not make me the 
implementation and skills for the construction of 
highways Belgrade - Pristina. Both sides must im-
plement the Belgrade-Pristina railway agreement. 
The agreement also addresses the provision of fi-
nance to support loans required for small and me-
dium-sized enterprises.  
Part of this agreement is:  
– entire international presence in Belgrade of the 
US International Corporation for Financial Devel-
opment;  
– operationalisation of the facility at the Merdare 
joint border crossing point;  
– involvement of both parties in the “mini-
Schengen area”, announced by Serbia, Albania and 
Northern Macedonia in October 2019;  
– mutual recognition of diplomas and professional 
certificates;  
– agreement of both parties to work with the De-
partment of Energy of the US and other US Gov-
ernment entities in a feasibility study to share 
Lake Ujman as a safe supplier of water and energy.  
Both sides have also pledged to multiply their en-
ergy sources. An essential point in this agreement 
for the geopolitical and economic interests of the 
US is also the commitment of both parties to ban 
the use of 5G devices, provided by incredible ven-
dors, in their communication networks [10]. Also, 
an essential part of this meeting was the recogni-
tion of Kosovo by Israel. 
The peculiarity of this agreement is that the nego-
tiating parties have not signed an agreement with 
each other, but both separately with the US. This 
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agreement also proves the significant role that the 
United States can play in the future in improving 
relations between Kosovo and Serbia and reach-
ing a final reconciliation agreement. 
 
Possible options to reach an agreement 
As the parties consider the potential for an agree-
ment, the three options presented below are likely 
to be possible options to reach an agreement 
without harming the negotiating parties. 
Option one: Develop trade for recognition. Some 
hope that a combination of pressure, billions in 
development aid and investment for Serbia, along 
with the security of rapid EU membership, could 
lead to its recognition of Kosovo without signifi-
cant concessions from Pristina [19]. Many opin-
ions and forecasts have been given regarding the 
development of trade for recognition, but which 
are hesitant because if investments are made pos-
sible in Serbia and its membership in the EU can 
give wrong results and bring stalemate in devel-
opments. Twenty-seven countries must agree on 
EU membership. This is not a guarantee that can 
be used for Serbia, also when we know the situa-
tion of Serbia, which is not yet at that level to 
adapt to the level and conditions of the EU. How-
ever, “this scenario also raises the question (po-
tentially important under the other options as 
well) of what would happen if Serbia became a 
member of the EU before Kosovo. Since any of the 
EU member states could block the admission of an 
applicant, if Serbia joins first, it would be able to 
climb the ladder before Pristina follows suit” [19]. 
Second option: Autonomy. A second compromise 
option would be modelled after other European 
countries approached minority grievances by giv-
ing them self-government in autonomous territo-
ries [8]. Through the second option, both coun-
tries Kosovo and Serbia, should give some auton-
omy to minorities within their territory. Kosovo 
has an issue with the association of municipalities. 
Thus, under this option, a Serb district comprising 
ten Serb-majority municipalities would have its 
constitution, assembly, police force, court, and 
funding source. Pristina would only deal with de-
fence, foreign affairs, monetary policy and some 
law enforcement. The Presevo Valley would re-
ceive the same, or a similar set, of autonomous 
rights. In both countries, the autonomous district 
can also play a role in relations with the other 
state. The Serb entity receives Serbia and the Al-
banian entity from Kosovo [19]. 
Third option: Border modification (redefining). The 
third option for reaching a political solution be-
tween Pristina and Belgrade involves reciprocal 
border modifications, otherwise known as land 
swaps. Despite strong opposition from within the 
EU, supporters have for years argued that a terri-
torial exchange could be vital to unblocking the 
Kosovo-Serbia dispute [12]. An enforceable 
agreement would integrate border changes into a 
comprehensive agreement, including mutual 
recognition, paving the way for Kosovo’s mem-
bership in the UN and potentially opening the 
door to NATO and EU membership for Pristina, as 
well as Belgrade’s EU membership.  
Perhaps with the greatest possible attraction for 
both parties, an exchange would allow each to 
claim victory [19]. The people of Kosovo broadly 
welcome the redefinition of territories but often 
arouses fear among Serbs. The international com-
munity, led by Germany, does not see it as a good 
thing for geopolitical and regional reasons, which 
could lead to the destabilisation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This may be the best possible option 
that is most supported, but that may not be re-
solved for use, but that the anticipated expecta-
tions are the continuation of the status quo in the 
future. Kosovo can make concessions only with-
out the will of its people in other ways and solu-
tions. Serbia is also aware that it refuses to give up 
Kosovo. So, the international community’s in-
volvement led by the US is seen as the most facili-




The research belongs to the qualitative and quan-
titative type. The data were collected through a 
questionnaire distributed in Google Forms, while 
in the interviews, experts in the field of politics 
and diplomacy were interviewed.  
A total of 470 respondents were included in the 
research, while their age, gender and qualification 
are according to a random sample. The age groups 
are from 18 to 65 years old. Participants were 
58.9% male, while 41.1% female, while their qual-
ification is from primary school to doctoral educa-
tion. Dominant are the respondents with bachelor 
and master qualifications. The research lasted one 
calendar month. Initially, the data were coded in 
the program in SPSS (version 25). Questionnaire 
analyses were performed through descriptive sta-
tistical parameters (mean, standard deviation and 
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their distribution). At the same time, the hypothe-
ses were confirmed through ANOVA One and Two 
way and Independent Sample t-test. The inde-
pendent variables are age group, gender and qual-
ification. In contrast, the dependent variables are 
their opinion on the solution of the problem with 
Serbia through dialogue, the representation of Ko-
sovo in the dialogue, and the citizens’ opinion on 
the agreement in Washington. 
The purpose of the research is to analyse the opin-
ion of the citizens of Kosovo to the progress of the 
Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, to accurately measure 
the opinion of citizens on solving the problem 
through dialogue, Kosovo’s representation in dia-
logue, and citizens’ opinion on the Kosovo-Serbia 
agreement which is arrived in Washington. The 
research also includes interviews with experts on 
the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process. We received 
their views on the US involvement in the dialogue, 
the development of the dialogue so far, and their 
opinion on the final epilogue of the dialogue. 
 
Hypotheses 
H01. There are significant differences between 
the age groups of citizens and their opinion on 
solving the problem between Kosovo and Serbia. 
H02. There are significant differences between 
the level of education of citizens and their opinion 
on Kosovo’s representation in dialogue with Ser-
bia. 
H03. There are significant gender differences in 
their opinion on dialogue and Kosovo’s represen-
tation in dialogue. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A total of 470 respondents participated in the re-
search, while 129 of them belong to the age group 
18-25 years or 27.4%, 201 age group 26-35 years, 
77 age group 36-44 years, then 40 respondents 
age group 45-54 years and 18 respondents of age 
group 55-65 years. Males are a total of 277 re-
spondents, and 193 of the females. With primary 
education are two respondents or 0.4%, 99 are 
with secondary education or 21.1%, 223 respond-
ents with bachelor education or 47.4%, 127 with 
master or 27%, 15 are with PhD qualification and 
four respondents with other qualifications as 
courses. 
Over 67% of respondents think that the problems 
between Kosovo and Serbia should be resolved 
through dialogue. 
 
Table 1 – Demographic results 
Age N % 
18 - 25 years old 129 27.4 
26 - 35  201 42.8 
36 - 44  77 16.4 
45 - 54  40 8.5 
55 - 65  18 3.8 
N/a 5 1.1 
Sex N % 
Male 277 58.9 
Female 193 41.1 
Level of education N % 
Elementary school 2 0.4 
high school 99 21.1 
Bachelor 223 47.4 
Master 127 27.0 
PhD 15 3.2 
Other (Professional course) 4 0.9 
 
In comparison, 16.2% have a negative opinion 
that this does not happen in the form of dialogue, 
and over 16% said they do not know. Only 7% of 
respondents think that Kosovo has been well rep-
resented in the dialogue with Serbia so far; 47% 
say that this has happened on average. In compar-
ison, 44.5% say that there has been no excellent 
representation, and 1.5% do not know. Of the 
party that did not adhere to the agreement be-
tween Kosovo and Serbia, about 73% think that 
Serbia is the one that does not respond to the dia-
logue, 2.6% say that this is happening because of 
Kosovo, 8.5% do not know, and 15.5% of both 
parties together. 
 
Table 2 – Opinion of the surveyed citizens regarding 
the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue 
Do you think that dialogue will solve 
the problems between Kosovo and 
Serbia? 
N % 
Yes 317 67.4 
No 76 16.2 
I don’t know 77 16.4 
   
Do you think that Kosovo has been 
well represented in the dialogue with 
Serbia so far? 
N % 
Yes 33 7.0 
Average 221 47.0 
No 209 44.5 
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I don’t know 7 1.5 
   
Which party do you think has not 
adhered to the agreements reached in 
the talks? 
N % 
Kosovo 12 2.6 
I don’t know 40 8.5 
Serbia 345 73.4 
Both of them 73 15.5 
 
Over 90% of Kosovo citizens think that in case of 
non-implementation of the agreements reached, 
Kosovo should use protectionist measures such as 
taxes or reciprocity with Serbia. In comparison, 
3.8% have the opposite opinion, while 5.1% say 
they do not know. Over 50% of citizens think that 
the United States of America should be a mediator 
in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, 38% 
say that both together, 4.7% the European Union, 
2.8% neither and 1.1% say they do not know. 
Over 40% of Kosovo citizens see the agreement in 
Washington at an excellent average level, 8.5% 
good, while over 35% say that this is a bad deal for 
Kosovo, while 13% said they do not know. As an 
epilogue of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, over 36% 
see the redefinition of borders. In comparison, 
26.8% Reciprocity in the rights of Albanians in 
Serbia with Serbs in Kosovo. In comparison, 
21.3% say they do not know, 9.6% the association 
of municipalities, 5.1% the continuation of status 
quo, while others have very low percentages. 
 
Table 3 – Citizens’ opinion on the future of the Kosovo-
Serbia dialogue 
In case of non-implementation of 
the agreements reached in the 
dialogue, should Kosovo use 
protectionist measures (taxes, 
reciprocity) against Serbia? 
N % 
Yes 428 91.1 
No 18 3.8 
I don’t know 24 5.1 
   
Who do you think should be the 
mediator in the Kosovo-Serbia 
dialogue? 
N % 
Neither 13 2.8 
European union 22 4.7 
I don’t know 5 1.1 
United States 250 53.2 
Both together 180 38.3 
   
How do you see the agreement 
reached in Washington between 
Kosovo and Serbia by the Trump 
administration? 
N % 
Good  40 8.5 
Moderately good 203 43.2 
Bad 166 35.3 
I don’t know 61 13.0 
   
Which of the following scenarios do 
you think will be the epilogue of the 
Kosovo-Serbia dialogue? 
N % 
Association of Serb-majority 
municipalities 
45 9,6 
So far, there have been no 
negotiations (dialogue) but only 
fulfilled the wishes of Serbia. 
1 0,2 
The agreement imposed by the EU / 
US with bitter compromises for both 
parties! 
1 0,2 
Normalisation agreement. 1 0,2 
Final recognition by Serbia 1 0,2 
Mutual recognition 2 0,4 
Reciprocity of rights of Albanians in 
Serbia with Serbs in Kosovo 
126 26.8 
They are redefining the borders (the 
Albanian part of Presevo, Bujanovac 
and Medvedja to join Kosovo and the 
Serbian part of Leposavic, Zvecan and 
Zubin Potok to join Serbia. 
165 36,1 
Continuation of the status quo 24 5,1 
It is difficult to give an opinion as the 
negotiations have been very 
unfavourable for Kosovo, and the 
other side has been advantageous. 
1 0,2 
I don’t know 100 21,3 
It depends on the empowerment of 
the Far East and Russia and the US 
bypassing us 
1 0,2 
I do not know what will happen! 
Redefining boundaries would be the 
permanent solution 
1 0,2 
Only in favour of Serbia 1 0,2 
  
 
Verification of hypotheses 
H01. There are significant differences between the 
age groups of citizens and their opinion on solving 
the problem between Kosovo and Serbia. 
We have used the ANOVA One Way test to confirm 
the above hypothesis, where the independent var-
iable is the age group. In contrast, the dependent 
variable is the opinion of the citizens on solving 
problems with Serbia through dialogue. 
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Table 4 – Do you think that the problems between Kosovo and Serbia will be solved through dialogue? 
(Descriptive) 
Year N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
18-25 129 1.67 0.832 0.073 1.52 1.81 1 3 
26 - 35  201 1.42 0.725 0.051 1.32 1.52 1 3 
36 - 44  77 1.47 0.771 0.088 1.29 1.64 1 3 
45 - 54  40 1.28 0.599 0.095 1.08 1.47 1 3 
55 - 65  18 1.61 0.778 0.183 1.22 2.00 1 3 
Total 465 1.49 0.763 0.035 1.42 1.56 1 3 
Based on the above results, we see that in the age 
group 15-25 are 129 respondents with an average 
of their opinion 1.67 (which is between Yes and 
No), while the age group 26-35 has an average of 
1.42, the 36-44 age group has an average of 1.47, 
the 45-54 age group has an average of 1.28, and 
the 55-65 age group has an average of 1.61. 
 
Table 5 – Do you think that the problems between 











7.081 4 1.770 3.094 0.016 
Within 
Groups 
263.143 460 0.572   
Total 270.224 464    
 
The results of the ANOVA test show that we have 
a degree of freedom DF=460, square means of 
1.770, the test of statistical significance F=3.094, 
and p-value = 0.016, which is significant at 0.05% 
of the level of reliability. 
In this case, we say that statistically, age is a factor 
that influences the opinion of citizens on solving 
the problem with Serbia through dialogue. Those 
who are older have a more positive level towards 
problem-solving through dialogue, while a simi-
larity has the age groups 26-35 and 36-44 years. 
So, we accept the hypothesis and say that there 
are significant differences between the age groups 
of citizens and their opinion on solving the prob-
lem between Kosovo and Serbia, p-value <0.05%. 
H02. There are significant differences between the 
level of education of citizens and their opinion on 
Kosovo’s representation in dialogue with Serbia. 
We used the ANOVA One Way test to confirm the 
above hypothesis, where the independent varia-
ble is education. At the same time, the dependent 
one is the opinion of the citizens on solving the 
problem with Serbia through dialogue. 
 
Table 6 – Do you think that through dialogue, the problems between Kosovo and Serbia will be solved (Descriptive) 





95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Elementary school 2 2.50 0.707 0.500 -3.85 8.85 2 3 
Hight School 99 1.60 0.768 0.077 1.44 1.75 1 3 
Bachelor 223 1.60 0.826 0.055 1.49 1.71 1 3 
Master 127 1.22 0.548 0.049 1.12 1.32 1 3 
PhD 15 1.20 0.561 0.145 0.89 1.51 1 3 
Others (professional 
course) 
4 1.75 0.957 0.479 0.23 3.27 1 3 
Total 470 1.49 0.761 0.035 1.42 1.56 1 3 
The above results show that respondents with 
primary qualification have an opinion much far-
ther from other groups with an average of 2.50. 
Respondents with secondary qualification have 
an average of their opinion of 1.60. Respondents 
with bachelor qualifications have an opinion on 
solving the problem with an average of 1.60; mas-
ter has an average of 1.22, PhD 1.20, and those 
with other qualification have an average of 1.75. 
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Table 7 – Do you think that the problems between 











16.652 5 3.330 6.065 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
254.795 464 0.549   
Total 271.447 469    
 
The results of the ANOVA test show that we have 
a degree of freedom DF=469, average in squares 
of 3,330, test F=6.065 and p-value = 0.000, which 
is significant at 0.01% of the level of reliability. In 
this case, we say that the respondents with master 
and PhD qualification have a more approximate 
opinion, while the difference lies in the other 
groups. So, we accept the hypothesis and say that 
there are significant differences between the level 
of education of citizens and their opinion on the 
representation of Kosovo in dialogue with Serbia 
p-value <0.01%. 
H03. There are significant gender differences in 
their opinion on resolving dialogue and Kosovo’s 
representation in dialogue. 
To confirm the above hypothesis, we used the In-
dependent Sample T-test. At the same time, the in-
dependent variable is gender, and the dependent 
variables are the opinion of citizens on solving 
problems with Serbia through dialogue and their 
opinion on Kosovo’s representation in dialogue 
with Serbia. 
 
Table 8 – Do you think that the problems between Kosovo and Serbia will be solved through dialogue? (Group 
Statistics) 





Do you think that through dialogue, the problems between 
Kosovo and Serbia will be solved? 
Male 277 1.44 0.702 0.042 
Female 193 1.56 0.834 0.060 
Do you think that Kosovo has been well represented in the 
dialogue with Serbia until now? 
Male 277 2.28 0.608 0.037 
Female 193 2.58 0.650 0.047 
The above results show that in their opinion on 
the resolution of the dialogue with Serbia, men 
have an average of 1.44 and a standard deviation 
of 0.70, while women 1.56 and a standard devia-
tion of 0.83.  
 
Table 9 – Do you think that the problems between Kosovo and Serbia will be solved through dialogue? 
(Independent Samples Test) 
 Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Do you think that 
through dialogue, the 
problems between 










  -1.744 366.499 0.082 -0.128 0.073 -0.272 0.016 
Do you think that 
Kosovo has been well 
represented in the 










  -5.034 395.467 0.000 -0.299 0.059 -0.415 -0.182 
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In their opinion on the representation of Kosovo 
in the dialogue, we see that men have an average 
of 2.28 and a standard deviation of 0.60, and 
women have an average of 2.58 and a standard 
deviation of 0.65. 
The above results show that in the opinion of citi-
zens on problem-solving through dialogue, we 
have the test F=17.390, degree of freedom 
DF=366.49. P-value=0.082 above the level of 
credibility of 0.05%. We say that we do not have 
Significant gender differences in terms of their 
opinion on solving the problem with Serbia 
through dialogue. In contrast, in their opinion on 
the representation of Kosovo, we see that we have 
test F=3.083, degree of freedom of 395.46 and p-
wave=.000, which is significant at 0.01% reliabil-
ity. In the first case, both genders have a similar 
opinion, both men and women, while in the sec-
ond case in representation, women have a more 
negative opinion than men. 
In this case, we partially accept the hypothesis and 
say that there are significant gender differences in 
their opinion on Kosovo’s representation in dia-
logue. Still, there are no significant gender differ-
ences to problem-solving with Serbia through di-
alogue. 
 
Table 12 – Interviews with experts for negotiations Kosovo-Serbia 
Category Preliminary interpretation Text 





According to the interviewees, the US has 
been involved in the dialogue since the 
Rambouillet Talks, the Vienna Talks on the 
settlement of the final status and the 
Brussels Talks. The involvement of the US 
in these talks will give clarity to the 
dialogue and another pace, and this will 
happen in coordination with the EU and 
accelerate the achievement of a final 
agreement by resolving the problems 
between Kosovo and Serbia. US 
participation in the dialogue means to 
support and security for Kosovo. The US 
has left open any possibility and possible 
scenario that the parties agree to be the 
final solution. 
AK. The US has been fully involved in the 
Kosovo-Serbia talks before. The role and 
involvement of the United States have been 
crucial in the Rambouillet, Vienna and, most 
recently, Brussels talks. In the last two or 
three years, we have seen no change of 
format or a shift in the talks from Brussels 
to Washington. Still, a change of course 
towards resolving the remaining problems 
between Kosovo and Serbia after Kosovo 
declares independence. If until two or three 
years ago, the only option in the talks was a 
multiethnic Kosovo and the accommodation 
of the Serb minority in Kosovo, now at least 
Washington and any European country 
have left open the possibility of exchanging 
territory between Kosovo and Serbia. To 
finally resolve the problems between 
Albanians and Serbs and Serbia to get rid of 
this problem and get a visa for the 
complicated EU accession process and its 
secession from Russian influence. Some 
European countries did not agree with this 
new American strategy. Still, especially 
Germany, therefore, came the US insistence 
on a meeting in Washington to unlock the 
talks and convince the parties for a final 
solution to the Kosovo problems -Serbi. Of 
course, in public, this seemed like a US 
reawakening. But the truth is that the US 
has once again been the actual creator of 
talks and agreements like in Rambouillet, 
Vienna and Brussels. 
DA. US involvement in the Kosovo-Serbia 
dialogue would give the dialogue clarity, 
deeper cooperation between the mediating 
parties (US-EU), US determination for a 
long-term dialogue framework. In this 
context, a comprehensive agreement 
between Kosovo and Serbia will be 
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accelerated, with the final goal of mutual 
recognition. 
VY. US involvement in the Kosovo-Serbia 
dialogue has been good news for the region 
and especially for Kosovo. Given Kosovo’s 
long-term alliance with the United States, 
their involvement in the dialogue implies 
strong support for Kosovo and our 
sovereignty. But it is also suitable for the 
region as the US is the guarantor of regional 
peace and stability. At the same time, 
without their economic and diplomatic 
power, there is no other party that can then 
manage to impose the implementation of 
the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 
However, the unilateral and sometimes 
exclusionary leadership of White House 
envoy Richard Grenell has caused great 
confusion in Kosovo and the EU. 





Respondents think that these talks have 
had some minor successes but are 
essentially failed because both parties did 
not enter these talks in complete 
seriousness. As a result, the talks 
themselves did not meet their 
expectations, leaving much uncertainty for 
their future. In general, in this dialogue, the 
parties have dealt with technical issues 
bypassing the essence of the problem, 
which is political, even the political 
agreements that have been reached have 
not been implemented due to 
dissatisfaction and controversy between 
the parties, a concrete example is an 
agreement on the association of majority 
municipalities Serbian. 
AK. These talks were initially destined to 
fail. I say so by looking at and analysing the 
direction they took. Both sides did not enter 
these talks with due seriousness; both sides 
have agreed to negotiate only because this 
has been requested by the international 
community, namely the US. Given this (and 
this has been the case), the talks have not 
touched at all (at least not yet) the real 
problems that Kosovo and Serbia have, 
without the solution of which there can be 
no final solution, there can be no lasting 
peace, there can be no mutual recognition, 
and consequently, there can be no full 
integration into international mechanisms, 
especially not in the EU. 
DA. So far, there have been minor successes. 
However, the development and conclusion 
of the dialogue require a more precise and 
in-depth clarification of the content. We can 
say that so far, in a symbolic form, the 
dialogue has not even completed the 
elementary level because there is a lot of 
uncertainty about the future of both 
countries. 
VY. The Normalisation Dialogue held in 
Brussels has reached its limits, and there 
have been significant problems. The major 
problem is that it has been a dialogue that 
has dealt with ‘technical’ issues and focused 
on various agreements on various issues, 
thus avoiding the core of the political 
problem. Therefore, in this area, we have 
had more complex arrangements which 
have caused harm (like the one to the 
Association of Municipalities) without 
bringing any benefit and progress in the 
relations between the two countries. 
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3. What do you 
think will be the 
final epilogue of 
the talks? 
The parties have different opinions 
regarding the final epilogue. Some think 
the final solution will be to redefine the 
borders between Kosovo and Serbia. And 
that this redefinition of borders would 
create a permanent and lasting solution 
between the parties. Another solution is to 
implement the association of Serb-
majority municipalities, but the question 
will be about the type of competencies that 
this association will have. Another 
dilemma that the interviewees have is 
whether there will be reciprocal 
recognition after establishing the 
association. To recognise Kosovo, Serbia 
must make constitutional changes because 
Kosovo is a territorial part of Serbia within 
its constitution. In this regard, the EU, 
during the integration process, should put 
pressure on the Serbian state to change 
the constitution because no state can join 
the EU if there is a territorial dispute with 
a neighbouring state. 
AK. The final epilogue? With this flow of 
negotiations, with this approach of the 
parties to the negotiations, with this way of 
treating the parties by the international 
factors involved, there will be no epilogue at 
all! The talks will be endless! Many 
agreements can be written and signed! They 
can force Kosovo for other compromises, 
such as association without or with 
competencies, special autonomy for the 
north of Kosovo, or where I know what, but 
there will be no solution. There will be no 
final agreement; recognition of Kosovo by 
Serbia there will not be. 
Things would change radically if the parties, 
both Kosovo and Serbia, with the proper 
seriousness raise in talks the real problems 
they have between them, and they are the 
Serb-majority north of Kosovo and 
Albanian-majority Eastern Kosovo. 
Kosovo must insist at all costs that whatever 
Serbia wants for the Serbs in the north, it 
must do for the Albanians in Presevo, 
Bujanovac and Medvedja. Kosovo should 
insist that no other standards be used for 
Serbs than for Albanians, i.e. great privileges 
for Serbs in Kosovo and oppression and 
discrimination against Albanians in Serbia. 
This way of dealing with problems logically 
and inevitably would redefine Kosovo and 
Serbia’s borders. Naturally, we would go 
towards the final solution of the problems 
between Kosovo and Serbia, respectively, 
the centuries-old Albanian-Serbian 
problem. I am not saying that this path is 
easy, but it is the only one. 
DA. I believe that there will be mutual 
recognition. Still, there should be 
constitutional changes in Serbia, and the EU 
will put pressure on them because a country 
can not be a member of the EU, which in the 
constitution has a place/territory it does not 
control. 
VY. As the ‘stars’ are currently listed, the 
epilogue is most likely to be the association 
of Serb-majority municipalities. It is 
questionable what the community’s 
competencies will be and what it will look 
like in the end. But the biggest question is 
whether Serbia will recognise Kosovo with 
this. There will be no agreement if there is 
no recognition because the Kosovar side is 
neither interested nor in need of an 
agreement that does not bring recognition. 
The issue is what Serbia wants in exchange 
for recognition. Suppose we remove the 
exchange of territory from the table. In that 
case, the only possible combination is the 
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community with regional integration (Mini 
Schengen) that will make Belgrade the 
regional capital. In this way, Serbia will 
adopt a kind of autonomy for the Serbs in 
Kosovo, do these avoid the borders of the 
Serbs in Serbia entirely, there in the 
Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the Serbs in 
Kosovo. And that will be enough for Serbia 
to recognise Kosovo’s independence. On the 
other hand, by completely removing the 
borders between them, the Albanians will 
organise the ‘Albanosphere’ unhindered and 
with significant economic, political, social 
and cultural potential. 
 
Final interpretation of interviews 
Topic 1. Involvement of the USA in the Kosovo-
Serbia dialogue. Since the time of Rambouillet, the 
US has been involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dia-
logue, the final status negotiations in Vienna, the 
Brussels dialogue, and the Washington meeting. 
In all these negotiations, the US has played a vital 
role. It is the main economic and diplomatic 
power, which can help reach a final solution be-
tween the parties and be the guarantor of the 
agreement’s implementation. The US has left open 
the possibility of any agreement the parties agree 
on, each of the possible scenarios outlined above. 
The novelty in these talks is precisely the opening 
of new alternatives for reaching an agreement, in-
cluding the option of redefining the borders of 
both parties. The United States’ involvement in 
the dialogue brings Kosovo more security (be-
cause the United States has been the primary sup-
porter of Kosovo’s independence) and can accel-
erate negotiations, positively affecting a final 
agreement. For the US, the Balkans is an area of 
particular interest, and therefore they will con-
tribute to these talks to create stability in the 
Western Balkans. 
Topic 2. Kosovo-Serbia dialogue until now. Alt-
hough there have been some minor successes in 
this dialogue, in essence, this dialogue cannot be 
considered successful for several reasons. First, 
the parties were forced to enter into a dialogue 
against their will, as a result of which there was no 
sincere attempt by the parties to reconcile their 
positions. The other reason is that the parties have 
run away from hot, substantive issues, dealing 
with secondary issues. So, the parties are engaged 
in technical talks, avoiding political ones, which 
are also the core of the dispute. But even those 
technical level agreements and the few political 
level agreements (association of Serb-majority 
municipalities) that have been reached have not 
been fully or completely implemented. So, due to 
these factors, negotiations have stalled with no 
improvement in relations between the two coun-
tries. Thus, the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations must 
be oriented towards political problems to reach 
an agreement that is final and acceptable to both 
parties. 
Topic 3. The final epilogue of the agreement. As 
the dialogue has developed so far, it is difficult to 
reach an agreement that would finally solve the 
problem between the two countries. But with US 
involvement, the dialogue could take a different 
turn. Since the US is more open to accepting any 
agreement acceptable to both parties, the parties 
can also negotiate other options for reaching a fi-
nal agreement. Three main options can be seen as 
an epilogue to the final agreement:  
1. Redefining the borders between Kosovo and 
Serbia, where the Albanian part of Presevo, Bu-
janovac and Medvedja join Kosovo; and the Serb 
part of Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok to join 
Serbia, and to remove the restrictions imposed by 
the Kosovo constitution from the Ahtisaari Pack-
age 
2. Remaining existing borders but establishing an 
association of Serb-majority municipalities with 
or without executive powers 
3. Mutual acquaintance with existing borders. As 
well as the last option which is less favourable, 
that of continuing the status quo. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We can say that the citizens of Kosovo have ex-
plicit opinions regarding their opinion on the 
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solution of the problem with Serbia, which they 
think should be resolved through dialogue. They 
do not see the representation of Kosovo at all well. 
According to the interviewed citizens, the culprit 
for the non-implementation of the agreements is 
Serbia, which is not adhering to them. As a result, 
reciprocity and taxes are seen as a solution. Ko-
sovo citizens see the US as a critical factor in the 
Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and see the Washington 
agreement as moderately good. Regarding the fi-
nal epilogue, most citizens think that redefining 
the borders would be the best solution. 
What we can recommend from this research is 
that the dialogue should move from the technical 
to the political level because the problem between 
the two countries is political. The parties must 
also compromise to reach an agreement accepta-
ble to both countries because, in negotiations, 
there is rarely an ideal solution that meets the 
maximum expectations of the parties. Also, the in-
volvement of the US in these negotiations is more 
than necessary because it changes the negotiating 
spirit and enables the parties to find an acceptable 
agreement, allowing the parties to negotiate for 
other options which have not been previously ac-
cepted. Based on the majority of the surveyed cit-
izens and the research done by us, we think that a 
satisfactory agreement that would solve the prob-
lem between Kosovo and Serbia once and for all 
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